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LOOKING TO FILL AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
GAP: BRAZIL BRINGS THE ISSUE OF EXCHANGE RATES 
AND TRADE BEFORE THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Antonia F. Pereira∗ 
Silas W. Allard∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Concern over the relationship between exchange rates and trade has a long 
history in both international law and economics. This concern has manifested 
itself in two primary ways: first, as a worry about the impact of currency 
fluctuation on trade flows and, second, as a worry about the impact of currency 
manipulation on fairness in the international trading regime. While there is no 
consensus on how to address the problems created by the relationship of 
exchange rates and trade, this lack of consensus has done nothing to diminish 
states’ concerns over the impact of currency fluctuation and manipulation on 
trade. Rather, increased fluctuation and increased protectionism during the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008 has led to rising concerns about the 
impact of exchange rates on trade.1 
In this climate, Brazil recently called for a debate on exchange rates and 
trade within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), specifically in the 
Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance (“WGTDF”), “with a view to 
better understanding the issues involved and their implications for members of 
the WTO.”2 Thus far, the Brazilian proposal has led to a review of the 
academic literature on the relationship of currency fluctuation to trade flows 
and a two-day meeting in March 2012 to discuss the literature review.3 More 
 
 ∗ Antonia F. Pereira is a law clerk to the Honorable Delissa A. Ridgway, Judge of the United States 
Court of International Trade. 
 ∗∗ Silas W. Allard is a law clerk to the Honorable Donald C. Pogue, Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of International Trade. 
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Court of 
International Trade or any judge on that court. 
 1 Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, The Relationship Between Exchange Rates and 
International Trade: Submission by Brazil, at 1, WT/WGTDF/W/53 (Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Brazil 
Proposal] (submission by Brazil to the World Trade Organization’s Working Group on Trade, Debt and 
Finance). 
 2 Id. at 1–2. 
 3 See infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
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recently, Brazil has indicated that it would like to see the discussion move in 
the direction of possible trade remedies.4 The Brazilian proposal raises 
important questions about the reigning structure of international financial 
regulation and the future of currency market regulation. 
This Recent Development will provide background on Brazil’s proposal 
and identify important issues and possible implications of this proposal for the 
current structures of international economic regulation, particularly in the 
context of international trade.5 
I. BACKGROUND: CURRENCY AND THE WTO FRAMEWORK 
The international community has long recognized a link between trade and 
currency. One aspect of this relationship is a long-held presumption that 
exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on trade flows.6 While current 
literature on exchange rate volatility and trade flows does not necessarily bear 
out this conclusion,7 such a presumption seemed logical in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression—a period that witnessed both massive volatility in currency 
markets and extreme protectionism. The apparent link between exchange rate 
volatility and trade protectionism during the Great Depression was an aspect of 
what motived international leaders to create a new, post-war framework for 
international economic cooperation and regulation that included the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”). Though the history of these institutions has been treated 
extensively,8 a brief review of their origins and goals provides context for the 
renewed discussion on exchange rates and trade initiated by Brazil. 
 
 4 See Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, The Relationship Between Exchange Rates and 
International Trade: Exchange-Rate Misalignment and Trade Remedies: A Conceptual Note by Brazil, at 8–9, 
WT/WGTDF/W/68 (Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Brazil Note] (conceptual note written by Brazil for the benefit 
of the World Trade Organization’s Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance). 
 5 Neither of the authors is a trained economist, and for this reason we do not attempt to assess the 
economic arguments that are an essential aspect of this discussion. Rather, our goal is to make the reader 
aware of this discussion in the arena of international trade law and to suggest, in a broad way, where such a 
discussion may lead. 
 6 PETER B. CLARK ET AL., A NEW LOOK AT EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND TRADE FLOWS 1–2 
(2004). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION (Deepak Nayyar ed., 2002); Marc Auboin, Fulfilling the 
Marrakesh Mandate on Coherence: Ten Years of Cooperation between the WTO, IMF and World Bank 1 
(WTO Discussion Paper No. 13, 2007). 
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While the Great Depression had a variety of catalysts, historians generally 
agree that the economic devastation was worsened by the competitive 
devaluation of major currencies9 and the implementation of trade barriers to 
protect domestic economies.10 As consumer buying power declined and trade 
diminished, global export production fell, resulting in widespread 
unemployment and poverty.11 The international community responded to the 
Great Depression, in part, by addressing the devastating lack of cooperation 
among countries in the face of crisis through a set of institutions and policies 
that came to be known, collectively, as the Bretton Woods System.12 
Named for the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, where it was 
developed, the elements of the Bretton Woods System remain the foundation 
for the current architecture of international economic regulation. A tripartite set 
of institutions responsible for international economic regulation was proposed 
at Bretton Woods: the IMF, the World Bank Group (“World Bank”),13 and the 
International Trade Organization (“ITO”).14 The IMF and World Bank were 
quickly approved.15 The World Bank was created to provide capital to 
underdeveloped nations, while the IMF was to lend reserve currencies to 
nations with a trade deficit and monitor exchange rates.16 The ITO, which was 
intended to bring stability to the international trade regime, failed to gain 
approval.17 Despite the ITO’s failure, the GATT,18 drafted during the meeting, 
was given provisional effect; however, instead of being administered by the 
ITO, a small staff in Geneva was given the task until 1995 when the GATT fell 
under the auspices of the WTO.19 
 
 9 E.g., Charles Blum, Foreword: The Question of Currency Manipulation, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 207, 
207 (2011); see also, e.g., Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944–71), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).  
 10 E.g., Auboin, supra note 8, at 4. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Jeffrey S. Beckington & Matthew R. Amon, Competitive Currency Depreciation: The Need for a More 
Effective International Legal Regime, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 209, 209 (2011). 
 13 The World Bank Group was originally known as the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development. Id. at 211. 
 14 Id.  
 15 See id. (stating that the IMF and World Bank were established at the Bretton Woods Conference 
itself). 
 16 Jong-Il You, The Bretton Woods Institutions: Evolution, Reform, and Change, in GOVERNING 
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 8, at 209, 210–11. 
 17 Beckington & Amon, supra note 12, at 220–22. 
 18 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
 19 Beckington & Amon, supra note 12, at 220–22. 
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A critical, non-institutional element of the Bretton Woods System was a 
new exchange rate regime to replace the gold standard. The gold standard had 
failed to maintain exchange rate stability during the inter-war period, and the 
representatives at the Bretton Woods Conference viewed currency stability as 
essential to rebuilding the global economy.20 Under this new regime, countries 
agreed to fix their exchange rates to the U.S. dollar, while the U.S. dollar was 
linked to gold in order to have exchangeable currencies at stable and 
predictable rates.21 
Concern over the impact of exchange rate volatility included concern over 
its effect on trade, and delegates raised this issue in the context of the ITO 
negotiations. Specifically, during the Havana Charter negotiations, parties 
recognized that “devalued currencies might constitute a form of unfair trade,” 
and the Australian delegation put forward a proposal to include “currency 
dumping” as a remediable trade practice.22 The Australian proposal was 
dismissed during the negotiations, and concerns over currency fluctuation were 
not ultimately addressed as remediable practices in the GATT.23 Evidence of 
the concern over the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade is not, however, 
entirely absent from the GATT; rather, as discussed below, several GATT 
articles address various aspects of the relationship between exchange rates and 
trade, but none create a trade remedy for imbalances occasioned by exchange 
rate fluctuation.24 
The Bretton Woods’s fixed exchange rate system ended in 1971 when U.S. 
President Richard Nixon severed the link between the value of the U.S. dollar 
and the value of gold.25 Once the United States delinked the dollar from gold, 
other major economies around the world stopped fixing their currencies to the 
 
 20 R.S. GORSKI, SUMMARY REPORT ON BRETTON WOODS MONETARY CONFERENCE 1–2 (1945), available 
at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/18_03_194505xx.pdf. 
 21 MICHAEL W. KLEIN & JAY C. SHAMBAUGH, EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN THE MODERN ERA 27 
(2010); see Beckington & Amon, supra note 12, at 237. 
 22 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Lake Success, N.Y., Jan. 20–Feb. 25, 
1947, Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Mar. 5, 
1947); see also Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing Australia’s proposal to regulate the use of “currency 
dumping duties”). 
 23 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 2. 
 24 See GATT, supra note 18, art. II:6 (permitting specific tariff adjustments to counteract the effect of 
currency devaluation); id., art. XV:4 (prohibiting frustration of the GATT through exchange action or 
frustration of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund through trade action); see also 
Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 2. These GATT articles are discussed further infra Part III. 
 25 JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22658, CURRENCY MANIPULATION: THE IMF 
AND WTO 1 (2011). 
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dollar and, instead, let their exchange rates float.26 Following the end of the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the international community did 
not create a replacement mechanism to provide what WTO Director General, 
Pascal Lamy, has referred to as a “sense of organized governance in the 
international monetary system.”27 Rather, in the post-Bretton Woods world, a 
variety of exchange rate regimes exist: Some states allow exchange rates to 
float freely (what is sometimes referred to as market-determined rates); some 
states allow rates to float within a range of values; and others continue to peg 
their currency’s value to a foreign currency.28 
The end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system meant two things 
for the international monetary system. First, as discussed above, exchange rates 
are largely unregulated. The IMF plays an advisory role, with the goal of 
stabilizing exchange rate policy, but it does not have any direct regulatory 
authority over exchange rate regimes.29 Second, the end of Bretton Woods’ 
fixed exchange rates meant that individual countries could directly affect their 
own exchange rates, and the possibility of currency manipulation became an 
important focus of international concern.30 The basic formulation of this 
concern is as follows: If an exporting country intervenes to keep the value of 
its currency low, such devaluation drives down the price of exports from that 
country allowing its exporters to undercut both the domestic industry in an 
importing country and other competing foreign exporters.31 Recent attention 
paid towards the issue of currency manipulation has largely focused on 
accusations of currency manipulation by the United States against China.32 
China has historically intervened in exchange markets to, in China’s view, 
maintain the stability of its currency.33 However, many policymakers and 
 
 26 See You, supra note 16, at 211–12. 
 27 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, Opening Remarks at the WTO Seminar on Exchange Rates and Trade 
(Mar. 27, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl222_e.htm). 
 28 KLEIN & SHAMBAUGH, supra note 21, at 27–28. As Klein and Shambaugh note, this is a simplified 
categorization, and most countries employ different exchange rate policies at different times or in concert. Id. 
at 29–30.  
 29 See Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the 
G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 528 (2012). 
 30 SANFORD, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
 31 See Bryan C. Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a ‘Currency Manipulator’? The 
Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 INT’L LAW. 
1257, 1296 (2009). 
 32 For a discussion of the U.S. approach to Chinese currency intervention, see SANFORD, supra note 25, 
at 4–5. 
 33 Public Announcement of the People’’s [sic] Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate 
Regime, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA (July 21, 2005), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2001/20014/ 
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scholars argue that Chinese intervention is intended to keep the value of its 
currency artificially low and, consequently, more competitive against other 
foreign currencies.34 In light of the potential impact on trade flows and 
domestic industry, U.S. lawmakers have repeatedly attempted to pass 
legislation making Chinese currency practices a countervailable subsidy 
subject to offset by countervailing duties.35 Though these efforts have not yet 
been fruitful, they highlight the potential impact of concerns over currency 
manipulation on the law of international trade. Furthermore, direct intervention 
to control currency valuation is not the only practice that raises international 
concerns over currency manipulation. Other states have begun to target 
accusations of manipulation against the United States for what they perceive as 
the manipulative effect on currency value that results from U.S. fiscal policy, 
particularly the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing.36 It is this 
broader notion of manipulative currency practices that Brazil is targeting with 
its efforts to remedy what it refers to as “currency misalignment.”37 
This is the context in which Brazil first proposed a program of study and 
discussion in the WGTDF, and more recently suggested that the discussion be 
taken in the direction of trade remedies. Before addressing Brazil’s proposal, 
however, it is worth asking whether, under the current regime of international 
trade law, the WTO or its member states have the tools to fill this regulatory 
gap. 
II. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME AND EXCHANGE RATES 
When looking for current responses available to the WTO and its member 
states, the GATT is the logical first place to look. Not surprisingly, Brazil 
 
20014_.html [hereinafter Public Announcement] (“The People’s Bank of China is responsible for maintaining 
the RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, so as to promote the basic 
equilibrium of the balance of payments and safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.”). 
 34 See, e.g., C. Fred Bergsten, The Need for a Robust Response to Chinese Currency Manipulation—
Policy Options for the Obama Administration Including Countervailing Currency Interventions, 10 J. INT’L 
BUS. & L. 269, 272–73 (2011); Benjamin Blase Caryl, Is China’s Currency Regime a Countervailable 
Subsidy? A Legal Analysis Under the World Trade Organization’s SCM Agreement, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 187, 
187–88 (2011). 
 35 For examples of American lawmakers’ attempts at counteracting China’s currency manipulation, see 
Mercurio & Leung, supra note 31, passim. 
 36 See, e.g., Bernanke Says the Fed’s Latest Monetary Policy Could Benefit the Global Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at B2 [hereinafter Bernanke Defends Fed Policy]; John Paul Rathbone & Jonathan 
Wheatley, Brazil’s Finance Chief Attacks U.S. over QE3, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/69c0b800-032c-11e2-a484-00144feabdc0.html.  
 37 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 1–2; accord Rathbone & Wheatley, supra note 36. 
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addresses the application of the GATT in its most recent submission, 
identifying three potential but ultimately insufficient articles. 
First, Article II:6 permits a country to adjust its scheduled tariffs higher to 
account for devaluations in its currency, thereby maintaining the effectiveness 
of the tariff rate, so that the country does not lose benefits it negotiated for in 
its WTO accession talks or subsequent negotiations.38 This tool, however, is 
limited to protecting effective tariff rates due to a country’s own currency 
depreciation and cannot be used in instances of currency appreciation, nor can 
it be used by a country threatened by imports made cheaper by depreciation in 
an exporting country’s currency value.39 
Brazil also looks to Articles XV and XXIII, which are intended to provide 
broader protection to the value of agreed upon concessions.40 Pursuant to 
Article XV:4, countries should not be permitted to frustrate the intent of the 
GATT through exchange rate practices.41 Brazil dismisses Article XV:4 as 
“not designed to equip Contracting Parties with the means to deal with the new 
challenges created by the weakness of the international monetary system 
following the collapse of the gold standard, nor to settle any related trade 
dispute.”42 As Brazil notes, an exchange rate practice must frustrate both the 
letter and appreciably depart from the intent of the GATT in order to violate 
Article XV:4,43 which places a high bar on determining that an action frustrates 
a provision of the GATT. Article XXIII:1(b) provides even broader 
protections, allowing a contracting party to challenge the application of any 
measure by another contracting party that impairs or nullifies any benefit 
accruing under the GATT, whether or not the measure conflicts with a 
 
 38 GATT, supra note 18, art. II:6 (“The specific duties and charges . . . and margins of preference in 
specific duties and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriate currency at 
the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by the Fund at the date of this Agreement. Accordingly, in 
case this par value is reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
by more than twenty per centum, such specific duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted 
to take account of such reduction.”). 
 39 See Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
 40 Id. 
 41 GATT, supra note 18, art. XV:4 (“Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent 
of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.”).  
 42 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 5. 
 43 GATT, supra note 18, Annex I (noting in the supplementary notes to Article XV:4 that “[t]he word 
‘frustrate’ is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement 
by exchange action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no appreciable 
departure from the intent of the Article”); Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 5. 
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provision of the GATT.44 Brazil also rejects an Article XXIII:1(b) action as 
requiring too high a burden because the complainant must both provide a 
“detailed justification” and “is likely to have to demonstrate that the measure 
adversely affects the competitive position of its products and that it was 
impossible to predict the adverse competitive position stemming from the 
measure when the concessions affected by the measure were negotiated.”45 
In short, Brazil argues that neither Article XV:4 nor XXIII:1(b) was 
intended to address the situation of currency misalignment and that each places 
a burden on the complainant that would make it too difficult to show that a 
practice resulting in currency misalignment either frustrates the intent of the 
GATT or results in a nullification or impairment of benefits. Brazil is correct 
that neither provision was drafted in contemplation of addressing exchange 
rate practices, precisely because they were drafted in a context in which 
exchange rates were the province of the IMF.46 Furthermore, there are high 
burdens under these actions because they are exceptional, and Brazil is likely 
correct that it would be quite difficult to bring a complaint against an exchange 
rate policy under either provision, though it is an untested proposition. In the 
end, however, these provisions do not appear to provide the efficient and 
effective response to the adverse trade impact of currency misalignment that 
Brazil believes is necessary.47 
 
 44 GATT, supra note 18, art. XXIII:1(b) (“If any contracting party should consider that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of . . . the application by another contracting 
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement.”). 
 45 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 5. 
 46 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 18, art. XV (making questions or disputes regarding exchange rates and 
other fiscal policy matters subject to coordination and cooperation with the IMF). 
 47 See Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 6 (noting in the context of Article II:6 that negotiations could not be 
expected “to deliver timely solutions for Members in need for immediate relief on account of more or less 
enduring but disruptive impacts of currency misalignments”). In this regard it is worth noting that Article II:6, 
Article XV:4, and Article XXIII:1(b) actions must be decided through negotiation or by the WTO before 
corrective action can be taken. GATT, supra note 18, arts. II:6(a) (requiring collective action pursuant to art. 
XXV), XXII (requiring consultation “with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement”), 
XXIII:1–2 (requiring bilateral consultation followed by multilateral consultation and investigation of alleged 
acts of nullification or impairment). By contrast, with a trade remedy, the importing country can take action 
upon its own initiative and then the onus is on the exporting country to initiate a challenge before the WTO. 
See, e.g., Int’l Trade Admin., Dep’t of Commerce, An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, http://ia.ita.doc. 
gov/intro/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (describing the unilateral process of assessing a trade remedy); 
see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes apps. 1–2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU] (listing those agreements and provisions of the GATT covered by the DSU).  
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It has also been suggested that illegitimate currency practices might be 
corrected under the auspices of current trade remedies: safeguards, 
antidumping duties, or countervailing duties. The use of countervailing duties 
is the most likely of these three options.48 Whether there is a basis under the 
current WTO system for making currency manipulation a countervailable 
subsidy is, however, subject to debate.49 The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”) was enacted with the goal 
of disciplining government interventions that distort international trade or have 
the potential to do so.50 According to the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is a 
“financial contribution” or “any price support” offered by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member State, which confers a benefit.51 
The SCM Agreement provides Member States with remedies when a subsidy is 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement and actionable (injuring or causing 
serious prejudice to the domestic market of a trading partner, or nullifying or 
impairing benefits under the GATT accruing to a trading partner).52 
 
 48 Goods are considered dumped and, therefore, subject to an antidumping duty when “the export price of 
the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.” Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter 
Antidumping Agreement]. Brazil argues that antidumping duties are inappropriate because they are exporter-
specific, and because exchange rates apply across an entire country. Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 7–8. While 
this is a valid concern regarding the efficacy of addressing currency misalignment through antidumping duties, 
a more fundamental difficulty exists. Namely, currency misalignment is unlikely to be reflected in the 
dumping margin as misalignment. If Company A sells a product in its home country, Country A, for two 
Country A Dollars and sells that product to importers in Country B for 1 Country B Dollar, then it is, by 
definition, dumping if the exchange rate is 1:1. However, if the exchange rate is 1:2, then there is no dumping 
because the prices are the same once the exchange rate is factored into price, whether the currencies are 
misaligned or not. See Antidumping Agreement, supra, art. 2.4.1. 
A safeguard may be imposed when a country experiences such increased imports of a given product 
that domestic industry is seriously injured or threatened with serious injury. Agreement on Safeguards art. 2.1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
154 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]. As Brazil notes, a safeguard must be implemented on a product, not a 
specific country; therefore, application of safeguards would fail to address bilateral currency misalignment as 
all countries exporting a good subject to a safeguard measure would be affected by the measure. Id. art. 2.2; 
Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 8.  
 49 See Elizabeth Pettis, Is China’s Manipulation of Its Currency an Actionable Violation of the IMF 
and/or the WTO Agreements?, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 281 (2011); Mercurio & Leung, supra note 31. But see 
Caryl, supra note 34; Alusio de Lima-Campos & Juan Antonio Gaviria Gil, A Case for Misaligned Currencies 
as Countervailable Subsidies, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 1017 (2012). 
 50 Simon Lester, The Problem of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC—
Aircrafts Case, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 345, 369–70 (2011). 
 51 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].  
 52 Id. art. 4.  
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In order to prove the existence of an actionable subsidy, a government must 
provide a financial contribution that confers a benefit to a specific industry.53 
Although currency manipulation may distort the competitive playing field, 
such manipulation may not meet the specificity requirement of the SCM 
Agreement. This is because, generally, all companies located in a country that 
undervalues its currency benefit from the Government’s currency manipulation 
because lower currency values allow exporters to undersell foreign 
competitors.54 If all exporters benefit, it is difficult to identify any specific 
recipient of the benefit. 
Furthermore, the expansive notion of currency manipulation introduced by 
Brazil also raises questions about how currency manipulation is defined. Brazil 
addresses not only direct manipulation by countries that actively control the 
value of their currency—what China is often accused of—but also other state 
interventions that impact exchange rates, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank’s policy of quantitative easing.55 Brazil’s approach seems to be premised 
on the notion that government interventions that affect currency value confer 
an unfair competitive advantage. If currency manipulation is defined as state 
interventions that limit the exchange rate movement of a country’s currency, 
then the possibilities for new types of countervailable subsidies expand 
dramatically. 
III.  BRAZIL’S PROPOSAL 
To remedy what it perceives as a harmful regulatory vacuum that leads to 
currency misalignments with adverse impacts on trade, Brazil has called on the 
international community to address this concern. Specifically, Brazil has raised 
the issue in the context of the WTO and suggested that filling the exchange 
rate regulatory gap may require trade remedies. 
Brazil argues that the interaction of exchange rates and trade affects every 
country, and, if not addressed by the international community, countries will 
begin to craft their own responses to exchange rate distortions, which may lead 
to tariff wars and increased protectionism.56 Furthermore, Brazil, as one of the 
 
 53 Id. arts. 1, 2.  
 54 Pettis, supra note 49, at 294–95 (noting the problem of showing specificity for currency manipulation 
but arguing that a case could be made against China).  
 55 Rathbone & Wheatley, supra note 36. 
 56 See Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 6; see also Josué Gomes da Silva, Chief Exec. Officer, Coteminas, 
Brazil, Presentation at WTO Seminar on Exchange Rates and Trade (Mar. 27, 2012) (presentation slides 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/devel_27mar12_e.htm) (click on the link titled 
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most prominent voices in the developing world, is not only warning against the 
downside risk of failing to address the relationship of exchange rates and trade. 
Brazil is also urging the international community to provide an appropriate 
institutional framework to promote what it sees as development–oriented trade 
and finance. As Pakistan points out in a submission in support of Brazil’s 
proposal, “[t]he current thinking presumes that liberalization of trade and 
market oriented finance policies provide development by themselves.”57 
However, Pakistan goes on to argue that such an approach is insufficient 
because the harms of unregulated fiscal and monetary policy counterbalance 
the benefits of access to markets for the developing world.58 This sentiment, 
that liberalization alone is insufficient, captures the Brazilian concern that 
liberalized financial policies, including exchange rate policies, have negative 
impacts on trade, particularly in developing countries. 
Brazil argues that lower trade barriers, which increase trade opportunities 
for the developing world, are offset by the rising value of developing world 
currencies that result from fiscal policies that devalue currencies in the 
developed world. In its proposal to the WGTDF, Brazil described its concern 
this way: 
Responses to the financial and economic crisis of 2008/09 have 
included the adoption, by a vast number of countries, of largely 
similar fiscal expansionist measures coupled with the lowering of 
interest rates. Yet, differently calibrated mixes of monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments have caused relative exchange rates among major 
trading partners to fluctuate frequently, with potentially different 
long-term impacts on their respective trade balances.59 
As an example, Brazil has expressed pointed criticism of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank’s practice of placing more U.S. dollars into circulation by 
purchasing government debt, a practice known as quantitative easing,60 and the 
 
“presentation,” under Josué Gomes da Silva’s name); see also Len Bracken, Evenett Notes Rise in 
Protectionism by G-20, Highlights Change in Forms, 29 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 908, 909 (2012) 
(“Developing countries have . . . caught up and show no signs of slowing down [in resorting to 
protectionism].”). 
 57 General Council, Preparations for the Fourth Session on the Ministerial Conference, Proposal of the 
Establishment of a Working Group for the Study of the Inter-Relationship between Trade and Finance, paras. 
1–3, WT/GC/W/444 (Sept. 18, 2001) (proposal submitted to the WTO). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Brazil Proposal, supra note 1, at 1. 
 60 For a more thorough description of the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing, see Ben 
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, The Crisis and the Policy Response, Stamp 
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effect this practice has had on Brazilian firms’ ability to export goods.61 Brazil 
argues that the United States’ policy of quantitative easing depreciates the 
value of the U.S. dollar, causing the value of Brazilian currency to rise, and, 
thereby, impairs growth in Brazil’s export market.62 Importantly, Brazil’s 
concern over exchange rate fluctuation and currency manipulation is not 
limited to the recent target of such accusations, China;63 rather, as the 
foregoing example suggests, it encompasses a broader spectrum of countries 
and practices. 
With these concerns in mind, in April 2011, Brazil proposed that the 
WGTDF include in its program of activities “the relationship between 
exchange rates and international trade.”64 The proposed program has two 
Pillars. The first Pillar focuses on understanding the nexus between exchange 
rates and trade.65 The second Pillar has an institutional focus and seeks to 
analyze the application of the Coherence Mandate66 and the availability of 
redress in the multilateral trading system for Member States for distortions 
caused by exchange-rate misalignment.67 The goal of the proposed program is 
to better understand the impact of exchange rates on trade and their 
implications for Member States. 
On May 10, 2011, WTO members reached a consensus on proceeding with 
Brazil’s proposed first Pillar, including a review of the empirical research and 
literature on the relationship of exchange rates and trade.68 On September 27, 
2011, the WTO Secretariat completed this review, which found some evidence 
pointing to a strong connection between exchange rates and trade, and other 
evidence showing no connection.69 In response to the WTO’s survey, the 
 
Memorial Lecture at London School of Economics (Jan. 13, 2009) (transcript available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm). 
 61 Tom Miles, INTERVIEW—Brazil Breaks Currency Taboo at the WTO, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2012, 
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/wto-currencies-idINL6E8EN8F120120326. 
 62 Rathbone & Wheatley, supra note 36. Brazil has also criticized quantitative easing programs in other 
countries such as Japan. Id. 
 63 Brazil has also been highly critical of what it sees as distortive and unfair currency practices by China. 
The Controversy over Currency Manipulation, WASH. TRADE REP., Apr. 2, 2012, at 1, 3. 
 64 Brazil Proposal, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 65 Id. at 2. 
 66 For more information on the Coherence Mandate, see infra Part IV.B. 
 67 Brazil Proposal, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 68 Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, Note by the Secretariat, The Relationship Between 
Exchange Rates and International Trade: A Review of Economic Literature, para. 1, WT/WGTDF/W/57 (Sept. 
27, 2011) [hereinafter Literature Review] (note submitted to the WTO). 
 69 Id. paras. 75–76 (finding that “[o]n the question of the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade, the 
considerable array of theoretical and empirical literature remains somewhat ambiguous” and that “[o]n the 
ALLARD GALLEYSFINAL 4/3/2013 9:11 AM 
2012] LOOKING TO FILL AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY GAP 547 
WGTDF held a seminar in Geneva in March 2012 to discuss the relationship 
between exchange rates and trade in light of the Secretariat’s note.70 The 
seminar featured presentations by representatives of the private sector, public 
sector, international organizations, and academia.71 
The March seminar proclaimed a general agreement on the existence of a 
relationship between exchange rates and trade flows.72 Specifically, the 
discussion during the seminar focused on the relationship between trade flows 
and the misalignment of exchange rates, rather than on exchange rate 
fluctuation.73 Representatives at the meeting also made clear that it would be 
difficult to establish measures and assess exchange rates in different 
countries.74 This point confirmed the position of many Member States who 
believe that the WTO should not get involved in the management of exchange 
rates.75 The discussions during the March seminar did not expressly state what 
the role of the WTO should be, but the discussions did make clear that there is 
agreement that the WTO’s role is not to manage exchange rates.76 
While there continues to be significant skepticism about the WTO taking 
any action on exchange rates and trade, Brazil is pressing forward with its 
work agenda. On November 5, 2012, Brazil made a follow-up submission to 
the WGTDF, in which it continued to press for the WTO to address the trade 
impact of currency misalignment.77 As part of this follow-up submission, 
Brazil put forward a new set of inquiries that would need to be investigated for 
the WTO to address currency misalignment and suggested that the best course 
 
issue of the level of exchange rates (misalignments), theoretical and empirical studies over the years show that 
the relationship between the level of a currency and trade is so multi-faceted and complex that it is hard to take 
a firm line in any particular direction”). 
 70 WTO Seminar on Exchange Rates and Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 27–28, 2012), http://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/devel_27mar12_e.htm [hereinafter Seminar Program]. 
 71 For a full schedule of seminar presentations, see id. 
 72 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 1; see also Lamy, supra note 27; Vera Thorstensen, Lucas Ferraz & 
Emerson Marçal, Effects of Exchange-Rate Misalignments on Tariffs, VOX (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.voxeu. 
org/article/why-wto-should-care-about-exchange-rates. The parties to the March meeting insisted that the 
meetings be conducted behind closed doors. Daniel Pruzin, U.S., Others to Keep WTO Currency Talks Behind 
Closed Doors, 29 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 438 (2012). Therefore, much of what we know about the meeting 
comes from Brazil’s most recent submission to the WGTDF. See Brazil Note, supra note 4. 
 73 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 1. 
 74 Id. at 1–2. 
 75 See, e.g., China Objects as Brazil Seeks Discussion on Currency Trade Remedies, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/china-
objects-as-brazil-seeks-discussion-on-currency-trade-remedies/menu-id-896.html. 
 76 Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 2. 
 77 See id.  
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would be to create a trade remedy that member states could use to offset the 
negative impact of currency misalignment.78 As of the writing of this Recent 
Development, there has been no agreement to proceed with Brazil’s proposed 
second Pillar, and some countries have come out against Brazil’s recent 
suggestion for analytical work on a trade remedy.79 Nonetheless, Brazil has 
opened the discussion on exchange rates in the context of the WTO and is 
committed to pursuing that discussion. In this context it is worthwhile to 
consider the implications of what Brazil is proposing. 
IV.  ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 
While the WTO has not reached an agreement on proceeding to the second 
Pillar of Brazil’s proposal, the proposal itself has introduced a contentious and 
important debate with potentially widespread implications. The issues 
identified in the second Pillar—investigating the possibility of redress in the 
context of the multilateral trading system and resolving issues of coherence 
with other international institutions—are essential to any movement in 
addressing exchange rates and trade. Thus, it is important to examine the 
potential for regulating exchange rates within the current international legal 
framework and the implication of Brazil’s proposal on coherence between the 
WTO and the IMF. 
A. Defining an Unfair Trade Practice 
Any suggestion that a country should be able to correct for an exchange 
rate imbalance must address whether exchange rates, like for example labor 
rates, constitute a factor of trade that should accrue to the benefit of a country. 
This is especially true when considering the often-made argument that 
currency devaluation accompanies economic decline and is one mechanism by 
which a country can halt or reverse its economic fortunes by using the lower 
prices for its goods to spur exports.80 Assuming that such devaluation is not the 
result of manipulation, on what grounds would the WTO be justified to permit 
any sort of remedy for such devaluation under its current structure? In other 
words, how is devalued currency an unfair trade practice? 
 
 78 Id. at 8–9 (“Members may wish, against this background, to consider the need for exchange-rate trade 
remedies and to start some analytical work to that effect.”). 
 79 China Objects as Brazil Seeks Discussion on Currency Trade Remedies, supra note 75. 
 80 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Those Revolting Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2012, at A23; see 
also R.A., What Happens After the Fall, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE (July 10, 2012), http://www.economist. 
com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/07/devaluation. 
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Currency manipulation, in contrast, seems to invite a more concrete 
response in the form of trade remedies. Unlike currency fluctuation, currency 
manipulation is more easily defined as an unfair trade practice due to the 
proactive and affirmative rather than reactive and passive involvement by the 
respective government. Insofar as a state intervenes directly in the value of its 
currency for the purpose of creating a comparative trade advantage—or, 
perhaps, even when a state intervenes indirectly with the effect of creating such 
advantage—this is not an advantage that accrues from its comparative position 
in the market. However, the latter is not nearly as clear cut a case as the 
former. An important and difficult question raised by Brazil’s proposal is how 
to determine when an exchange rate imbalance is a legitimate expression of a 
state’s economic reality and when it is an illegitimate intervention by the state. 
Brazil’s notion of currency misalignment does not clearly fall on one side or 
the other of this conceptual divide. Currency misalignment may capture the 
seemingly illegitimate notion of currency manipulation, but it also captures 
fiscal activity that indirectly affects exchange rates. The question of how to 
determine what types of exchange rate imbalances should be considered unfair 
trade practices has not been answered. 
It may be that the exchange rate imbalance need not be an unfair trade 
practice to be remedied. Rather, such a remedy could be conceived of in the 
vein of a safeguard, which is less concerned with the unfair actions of a foreign 
country than an unexpected negative impact on domestic industry.81 
Safeguards—which are targeted at products not exporters or countries—are 
distinguished from unfair trade practices because they focus on the effect on a 
specific industry, regardless of the origin of the effect, rather than the actions 
of a specific actor.82 By contrast, imposition of an antidumping duty or 
countervailing duty requires a finding that either the exporter or the exporting 
country has engaged in an unfair trade practice, namely dumping or provision 
of an illegitimate subsidy.83 Exchange rate imbalances, however, are not like 
safeguards because an exchange rate imbalance always occurs between two 
countries and affects all goods from a specific country. A remedy to correct for 
an exchange rate imbalance would be ineffective if applied irrespective of 
source because such a remedy must be calibrated to account for the amount of 
the imbalance caused by a particular country. Likewise, such remedial 
 
 81 See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 48, art. 2.2 (noting that a safeguard is to be applied to all 
imports of the designated product irrespective of source). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Antidumping Agreement, supra note 48, art. 2. See generally SCM Agreement, supra note 51. 
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measures would be futile if applied to a limited array of products because the 
price of all goods from a country is affected by the exchange rate. Thus, a 
safeguard-style remedy would be both very broad with regards to products and 
difficult to apply on a most favored nation basis. Making every imbalance 
remediable certainly runs up against the question of whether a country should 
be able to benefit from its devalued currency, as discussed above, and, insofar 
as such a remedy were only applied selectively there must be some basis, such 
as an unfair trade practice, for such select application. 
The answer to the question of what constitutes a remediable trade practice 
under current international trade law includes unfair trade practices and 
specific, serious threats to domestic industry, but there is little guidance on 
how currency misalignment fits into these categories, in part because such a 
remedy was rejected during the GATT negotiations.84 It may be time to 
reconsider whether certain policies that result in exchange rate imbalances 
should be considered unfair trade practices given that the exchange rate regime 
is now largely unregulated. But, to do so requires weighing the importance of 
remedying adverse effects on trade against a country’s ability to promote other 
economic policies such as stability and growth.85 While there may be real and 
adverse impacts on trade due to currency misalignments, that does not, in turn, 
provide a solid theoretical ground for remedying misalignments. This does not 
mean that there is not a solid foundation for making currency misalignments 
remediable. However, while Brazil presses forward with analytical work on 
exchange-rate trade remedies, including the logistics of such a remedy, it 
would be worthwhile for others to consider how and whether such a remedy 
could or could not coexist with other remedies in the law of international trade. 
To answer such a question, in turn, raises the question of coherence. 
B. Coherence 
As L. Alan Winters notes in his article, Coherence and the WTO, coherence 
between the administrator of the GATT (currently the WTO), the IMF, and the 
World Bank has been a collective goal of these organizations since their 
origins.86 Coherence is seen as a process with the goal of achieving harmony 
 
 84 See Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 2. 
 85 Consider, in this regard, China’s justification for its direct intervention in the value of the renminbi, 
see Public Announcement, supra note 33, and the United States’ justification for quantitative easing, see 
Bernanke Defends Fed Policy, supra note 36, at B2. 
 86 L. Alan Winters, Coherence and the WTO, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 461, 462–63 (2007). 
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between trade, finance, development, and macroeconomic policy.87 The 
Coherence Mandate, adopted at Marrakesh in April 1994, during the 
negotiations that created the WTO, formalized this goal by directing “Ministers 
[to] confirm their resolution to strive for greater global coherence of policies in 
the fields of trade, money and finance, including cooperation between the 
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank for that purpose.”88 The WTO recognizes 
that, pursuant to the Coherence Mandate, “the WTO system is only one part of 
a much broader set of international rights and obligations that bind WTO 
members.”89 The Articles of Agreement of the IMF were created to 
compliment the provisions of the GATT through a coherent set of rules with 
the goal of achieving “the progressive liberalization of trade and payments.”90 
In a post-Bretton Woods world, exchange rates continue to fall under the 
auspices of the IMF, but the IMF has little control over actual rates. Rather, the 
IMF has the limited power to “exercise firm surveillance over the exchange 
rate policy of all members and adopt specific principles for the guidance of all 
members with respect to those policies.”91 Through the adoption of standards, 
the IMF may influence Member States’ policy; however, the IMF lacks the 
authority to compel Member States to comply with its rules or alter exchange 
rate practices.92 Arguably, this creates coherence problems where the adverse 
impacts of exchange rate policy must be addressed—for example, the adverse 
impacts on trade that Brazil is alleging—because exchange rates are 
unregulated and the IMF has no tools for direct intervention.93 Yet, the fact that 
the IMF’s role is now primarily advisory does not abolish the Coherence 
Mandate. 
 
 87 Auboin, supra note 8, at 1. 
 88 Marrakesh Declaration para. 18 Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization 1867 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Marrakesh Declaration]. Along with the Marrakesh Declaration, 
the WTO and the IMF also signed the Agreement Between the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organization recognizing the importance of the Coherence Mandate and agreeing, among other things, 
to: 1) consult each other regarding the discharge of their respective duties and 2) communicate regarding 
matters of mutual interest. SANFORD, supra note 25, at 4 & 4 n.9; see also Int’l Monetary Fund, Agreement 
Between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, WT/L/195 (Nov. 18, 1996), 
compiled in 36 SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND 932 (2011). 
 89 The WTO and Other Organizations, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
coher_e/coher_e.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 90 Auboin, supra note 8, at 5. 
 91 INT’L MONETARY FUND, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV, § 3 (2011), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm. 
 92 SANFORD, supra note 25, at 2. 
 93 See Winters, supra note 86, at 463 (noting that the disparate functions of the GATT, IMF, and World 
Bank have always contributed to a sense of incoherence, but that early in their existence these institutions 
operated in more clearly discrete arenas towards different ends). 
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In addition to the legal limitations of their respective agreements, the varied 
regulatory approach of the two organizations further complicates inter-
institutional cooperation on this issue. The WTO possesses a regulatory 
enforcement mechanism that functions through an adversarial, bottom-up 
process. Once a rule is set down under one of the international trade laws, it 
can be enforced through the WTO’s dispute settlement process.94 The IMF, in 
contrast, carries special expertise on currency issues and functions through a 
cooperative top-down approach.95 The IMF strives to maintain financial and 
exchange rate stability through consultation, technical assistance, and 
lending.96 
Brazil’s suggestion for trade remedies attempts to avoid the coherence issue 
by not directly regulating exchange rates. Rather, the proposal would allow 
states to counteract the negative effect of currency misalignment through 
something akin to a “currency duty.”97 In this regard, Brazil is proposing that 
the WTO, through its Member States, adopt a method for counteracting 
currency misalignment that fits within the WTO’s expertise and institutional 
structure. However, this does not totally dispel coherence concerns. First, such 
a remedy would be difficult without the involvement of the IMF.98 The 
unregulated nature of exchange rates means that it is a stretch of authority for 
any entity to conclude that a currency is not correctly valued. That being said, 
if any institution has such authority, it is the IMF, and not the WTO or the 
WTO’s Member States.99 Establishing a mechanism outside of the IMF would 
create the possibility of the WTO determining a currency is not correctly 
valued without the agreement of the IMF.100 This does not seem to comport 
with the Coherence Mandate. Furthermore, a currency duty would amount to 
an indirect method to regulate currency values and exchange rates in the same 
way that a countervailing duty is an indirect way to regulate certain kinds of 
 
 94 See generally DSU, supra note 47. 
 95 See Cho & Kelly, supra note 29, at 528. 
 96 Id.  
 97 See Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
 98 Brazil recognizes this when it suggests that in establishing methodologies for assessing currency 
misalignments, “[c]ooperation with the IMF could be explored.” Id. at 8. 
 99 See SANFORD, supra note 25, at 5. 
 100 Brazil suggests that establishing currency value for trade remedy purposes “would not be to establish 
optimal or equilibrium exchange rates for particular currencies, but rather to detect significant departures from 
historical or reasonable levels.” Brazil Note, supra note 4, at 8. While a determination of misalignment may 
not be prescriptive regarding the proper value of a currency, it is a determination that the stated value of the 
currency is not accurate or legitimate, and such a determination could run afoul of determinations made by the 
IMF.  
ALLARD GALLEYSFINAL 4/3/2013 9:11 AM 
2012] LOOKING TO FILL AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY GAP 553 
discouraged subsidies. Thus, even using a methodology solidly within the 
WTO’s wheelhouse, the implementation of such a methodology means the 
WTO must move into areas traditionally under the auspices of the IMF. At a 
minimum, concurrent discussions about such a policy should be underway in 
the IMF. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The international response to the Brazilian proposal has been tepid at best. 
Adding currency fluctuation to the WTO’s agenda has not been welcomed in 
the global arena.101 The possibility of increasing the IMF’s authority has been 
met with similar distaste.102 The international regulation of exchange rates is 
generally a sensitive issue amongst international trade partners, because 
exchange rates are generally a matter of sovereign control. There is some irony 
to the particular resistance to regulation of exchange rates through the existing 
international regulatory organizations, given the major role exchange rate 
stability and trade played in laying the foundation of those same organizations. 
Irony aside, the disagreement over which institution should regulate the impact 
of exchange rates on international trade coupled with the disagreement over the 
nature of the relationship between exchange rates and trade should lead one to 
surmise that the Brazilian proposal has a tough road ahead. Yet, the 
conversation that Brazil has begun will continue, for now.103 
Brazil’s proposal is an important development in the arena of international 
economic regulation. Brazil has highlighted ways in which developing 
economies may not see the full benefits of increased trade opportunities 
because of economic developments traditionally considered to be outside the 
purview of the multilateral trading system. The capacity to recognize and the 
ability to regulate, however, are two very different things. While it is too early 
to speak to the efficacy of any proposed resolution, and the hurdles to a 
negotiated solution are high, it is an important conversation for the 
international community to have. 
 
 101 See Lamy, supra note 27 (“All these issues require a mix of cooperation in the macro-financial field 
and proper domestic policies which lie outside the remit of the WTO. In the current volatile environment, we 
need to make sure that the WTO system does not crumble under the weight of excessive expectations.”); see 
also China Objects as Brazil Seeks Discussion on Currency Trade Remedies, supra note 75. 
 102 SANFORD, supra note 25, at 5 (“[F]ew countries want the IMF to have the kinds of power over their 
economies that it would need to compel violators comply with its rules.”). 
 103 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Exchange Rate Seminar Ends with Agreement to Continue Discussions, 29 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 534 (2012) (noting the general need among participants to continue the discussion, but that 
no date has been fixed for the next round of discussions). 
